Yemen's September Revolutions: Republic's Birth vs. Imamate's Return

The 26th of September 1962 marked not just a political shift but one of the most significant transformations in modern Yemeni history, overthrowing the long-standing Imamate and establishing the Yemen Arab Republic. This revolution heralded a new era for Yemenis, centered on citizenship, equality, and the construction of state institutions.

In the early hours of September 26th, Yemeni officers from the Free Officers' movement launched an uprising against the rule of Imam Muhammad al-Badr, proclaiming the Yemen Arab Republic under the leadership of Abdullah al-Sallal. The establishment of the republic was fiercely contested, leading to a civil war between republicans and royalists that lasted until 1970. Supporters of the Imamate, backed by significant regional and international support, including from Israel, attempted to restore their rule.

The fall of the Hamid al-Din dynasty, which had ruled northern Yemen under the Imamate system, represented more than just a political change. It shattered the monopoly on political and social decision-making tied to the concept of hereditary rule, redefining the relationship between citizens, the state, and authority. The republic introduced a new political principle: governance is a public affair, the state belongs to the community, and power is not an inherited right of any family or lineage. Thus, the republic became the core achievement of the September revolution, with equality among Yemenis in rights and duties, and the right to participate in state governance as its primary tenets.

The objectives of the 26th of September revolution laid the foundations for the republican system, cementing principles of freedom, equality, and public participation, and profoundly altering Yemeni life. Under the republic, Yemenis, regardless of their social background or region, could attain high state positions, establish political parties, participate in local, parliamentary, and presidential elections, and join civil, military, and security institutions. This was an unprecedented shift from a system where supreme authority was linked to the ruling family to one based on the principle of equality in governance.

Following the revolution, Yemen experienced significant expansion in education, with hundreds of schools established across cities and rural areas, alongside universities and vocational institutes. The republic opened educational opportunities to a broad segment of the population, enabling children from poor and rural families to access education and pursue various professions. This transformation produced thousands of doctors, engineers, teachers, judges, officers, administrators, and researchers. The country also underwent economic transformation, particularly with the discovery and extraction of oil and gas, alongside growth in trade and investment. State revenues were channeled into public services and projects, government employment expanded, and new sectors created job opportunities.

These advancements were not welcomed by the traditionalist forces who adhered to the notion of exclusive right to rule, viewing power as a religious and political privilege tied to lineage rather than a public right for all Yemenis. The conflict between the republic and the Imamate project persisted within Yemeni politics until it resurfaced violently with the Houthi militia's coup against the state and their takeover of Sana'a on September 21, 2014. In essence, September 21 represents a subversion of republican institutions and a revival of an armed, sectarian project that Yemenis had overthrown with the September 26th revolution. Since then, Yemen has entered a new phase of war and division, with state institutions disintegrating, services declining, and poverty, displacement, and violations escalating.

The Houthi militia has established numerous official and secret prisons, detaining thousands of opponents, activists, politicians, military personnel, human rights defenders, and civilians. Human rights reports and survivor testimonies have detailed torture, mistreatment, forced disappearances, and abuses within these detention centers, while UN reports have documented serious violations against detainees in Houthi-controlled areas. These practices have evoked memories of the Imamate prisons, associated with political repression, torture, and silencing dissent.

Despite controlling substantial financial resources in their areas, including customs, taxes, and levies, the Houthi militia refuses to pay the salaries of a large segment of state employees. Concurrently, the militia continues to impose multiple taxes to fund its military activities and events, while millions of Yemenis suffer from poverty, deteriorating services, and the absence of salaries. This disparity, according to employees, economic sources, and circulated documents, reflects a model of resource extraction from society without adequate redirection to public services and state employee salaries, mirroring the starvation tactics employed by the Hamid al-Din family.

The Houthi militia's attempt to reshape the state extends beyond military and political control to education and curricula. They have introduced modifications to school textbooks in areas under their control, embedding sectarian and ideological content linked to their political agenda, including concepts of loyalty to the militia and its leaders. This has raised widespread concerns about turning schools into tools for reshaping the consciousness of new generations according to a singular vision. This has also impacted higher education institutions, with the introduction of sectarian courses and activities, in an effort to reproduce an ideological system that revalidates concepts of sectarian discrimination that the September revolution had opposed.

More than a decade after the September 21st coup, the Yemeni citizen faces a fragmented state, divided institutions, a depleted economy, and a protracted war. The political and military division among anti-Houthi forces, coupled with multiple loyalties and agendas, has weakened the republican front and prolonged the war, with the Yemeni citizen bearing the cost. In response, politicians and experts propose unifying the republican front as the essential path to restoring the state and ending the coup. The core issue is not a struggle for a seat in power but a battle for the very nature of the Yemeni state: a state of equal citizens governed by institutions and law, or a state where an armed militia imposes its political and sectarian vision by force.

Sixty-four years after the 26th of September revolution, it remains a pivotal moment in the Yemeni consciousness, symbolizing the overthrow of the Imamate and the declaration of the republic, opening avenues for education, work, political participation, and state-building. In contrast, September 21st is remembered as an armed coup against the state and its institutions, marking the beginning of a new era of war, division, taxation, repression, and service decline. The current struggle of Yemenis is crystallized between these two dates: September 26th represents the transition from Imamate rule to the republic, while September 21st is associated with an attempt to revive a sectarian project outside state institutions. Therefore, commemorating September signifies not just recalling a historical event but reaffirming republican principles, foremost among them that rule is not an inherited right, the state does not belong to any family or group, and all Yemenis are equal before the law.

With the declaration of Yemeni unity on May 22, 1990, the Republic of Yemen became the framework for the unified state, continuing the republican journey that began with the September 26th revolution and intersected with the struggle of the national movement in southern Yemen against British colonialism, culminating in the October 14th revolution. From September to the present, the revolution's core message endures: Yemen is for all, the state is for all, and power is the right of citizens, not a privilege of a lineage.