Yemen's State Collapse: Accountability for Post-2011 Crisis Demanded

In the realm of politics, mere slogans and glittering titles are insufficient to establish legitimacy or persuade populations; the true measure lies in tangible outcomes on the ground: Has the state endured or vanished, have institutions consolidated or fractured, and has stability prevailed or has constant crisis defined daily life?

Since the events termed the February 2011 revolution—which ultimately devolved into a national catastrophe—the nation entered a sharp trajectory marked by the hoisting of banners promising change and salvation. However, the ensuing years revealed that merely removing the head of the previous regime does not inherently confer the capacity to construct a viable alternative system capable of governing the state.

Between aspiration and reality, Yemen has paid an exorbitant price in terms of its stability, unity, and institutional framework. The debate was never about the legitimacy of citizens demanding reform, as reform remains a perpetual necessity in any functioning state. What transpired, however, transcended the concept of reform to encompass a comprehensive demolition of the state structure without a coherent vision for the subsequent phase.

When institutions are dismantled under the pressure of street mobilization, impromptu alliances, and ill-conceived agendas, a vacuum ensues, compelling various factions to compete to fill it, each according to its own calculations and objectives. Today, after years of chaos and division, Yemenis are entitled to pose a direct question: Who bears responsibility for this trajectory, and who possesses the courage to acknowledge that administering a state is infinitely more complex than managing crowds and disorder, and that dismantling one system does not equate to the ability to build another?

Experience has demonstrated that governance relies not on reactive measures or mobilization rhetoric, but on robust institutions, independent national decision-making, and a delicate balance among political forces. When this equilibrium disappeared, crises expanded, authorities multiplied, and central authority receded in favor of competing centers of power.

Recalling the pre-2011 era is not blind nostalgia but a legitimate comparison between two distinct realities; this comparison is a national right, not a political luxury. Those who pledged to rescue the country are now obligated to provide a candid accounting: What has been achieved from their slogans, and where does the state stand now?

Yemen requires a courageous review that reinstates the concept of a comprehensive national state and halts the cycle of slogans unsupported by genuine governing capacity, rather than engaging in the exchange of accusations. Politics is a responsibility, and those who assume leadership under the guise of rescue must prove their competence through action, not mere declaration. Ultimately, proclaiming oneself the state's savior is insufficient; the crucial task is to demonstrate that one was not instrumental in its weakening or fragmentation.