Yemen Crisis: Call to Shift from External Management to Yemeni Responsibility

More than a decade into Yemen's protracted conflict, the focus must shift from the extent of coalition support to the reasons why this substantial aid has not culminated in the restoration of a functional state, its capital, and its institutions. A candid re-evaluation of the entire strategic approach, rather than the pursuit of further justifications, is urgently needed.

Since the coalition's intervention, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, significant political, military, financial, and logistical support has been provided to anti-Houthi forces. Despite the deployment of immense resources, the formation of numerous military units, and the continuous flow of weaponry and funding, the Yemeni state remains incapable of asserting full control domestically. This has resulted in rapid and devastating territorial losses, including the strategically vital West Coast, Bab el-Mandeb strait, and adjacent islands, alongside persistent daily attacks on Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure and civilian population.

The core issue appears to have transcended resource limitations and now lies within a complex web of vested interests. It is now legitimate to question whether the prolonged conflict has evolved from a temporary endeavor to restore the state into an environment where political, financial, and administrative networks benefit directly or indirectly from the perpetuation of the status quo. Long-standing wars not only inflict casualties and destruction but can also foster war economies and interest groups—officials, influential figures, merchants, intermediaries, leaders, political factions, and centers of power—who gain from the continuation of exceptional circumstances, chaos, and fragmented decision-making.

As years pass, these intertwined interests can reach a point where ending the war poses a threat to established positions and gains. The true danger lies in this dynamic: the restoration of state functionality would curtail extraordinary privileges, dismantle war-based economies, diminish non-institutionalized power centers, and subject officials to state oversight, law, and accountability. Conversely, an open-ended conflict allows for the justification of all actions under the guise of necessity and exceptional circumstances. The question arises: has the continuation of the crisis become a vested interest for certain parties?

While it is unreasonable to accuse all officials or political factions, it is equally illogical to dismiss the possibility of interest networks emerging that are tied to the crisis's persistence. The prolonged exceptional political and military situation, despite frequent changes in governments, leaderships, and positions, while the crisis endures, demands explanation. Furthermore, the continued presence of officials and political-military figures residing abroad for years, while the citizens they purportedly represent face severe internal economic, service, and security crises, warrants scrutiny. The persistence of a system of salaries, allocations, privileges, and expenditures, while the state itself remains unable to reclaim its institutions, also raises critical questions that must be openly discussed.

To our brothers in the Kingdom: a review of the management of this file is imperative. If the objective is genuinely the restoration of the Yemeni state, then the continued external administration of Yemen requires serious reconsideration. This does not imply abandoning Yemen or compromising Saudi Arabia's security and interests, but rather a fundamental shift in the approach to the file. The legitimacy must be returned to Yemen. The Presidential Leadership Council, the government, the Parliament and Shura Council, military and security leaders, social and political figures, and all those holding public office must return to Yemen to operate from Yemeni soil. They must face the citizens, bear responsibility for their decisions, manage state institutions from within, and personally lead the battle to restore the state, rather than allowing responsibility to remain fragmented between external and internal actors, across multiple capitals and centers of influence.

A state cannot be rebuilt from hotels; political statements, external meetings, conferences, and diplomatic gatherings do not construct a nation. A state is built within its institutions, an army in the field, a government accountable to its people, and a politician aspiring to lead their country must be present within it, not make residing abroad a permanent arrangement. If legitimacy is incapable of returning to Yemen, how can the capital be reclaimed? If leaders cannot manage liberated areas from within, how can they govern an entire state? The whereabouts of all previously provided resources also demand a transparent answer.

Anti-Houthi forces have received substantial military capabilities, including arms, vehicles, equipment, training, and logistical support, alongside the formation of numerous units and personnel. However, the past years have witnessed repeated field setbacks and collapses. The responsibility cannot always be attributed to the weaponry or a lack of support. Arms do not compensate for a lack of decision-making, money cannot replace leadership, numerous brigades do not constitute an army, and multiple commands do not forge a state. The fundamental problem has been, and remains in part, a fragmented political and military decision-making process, multiple centers of influence, conflicting priorities, and the absence of unified national leadership. Yemen should not be held hostage by crisis management; the most dangerous outcome is for the management of the war itself to become the objective.

War should be a means to a resolution, not a permanent occupation or a perpetual source of influence, funding, and privileges. When political and financial interests become tied to the continuation of the exceptional situation, ending the war becomes more difficult. Peace, in this context, signifies not only the cessation of hostilities but also a redistribution of influence, the dismantling of war-generated privileges, and the subjugation of all under state institutions and law. This is precisely what requires review. Allow Yemenis to bear responsibility for Yemen. The continuation of the current situation is draining all parties: Yemenis, the Kingdom, and regional nations. Therefore, the return of legitimacy in all its components to Yemen could represent a genuine turning point.

Bring them back to Yemen. Ensure officials live among their people, military commanders are in the field, politicians are accountable, the government operates within its institutions, Parliament is accessible to the populace, and political and military decisions originate from within. Only then can it be determined who genuinely seeks to restore the state and who wishes to perpetuate the current situation. Yemen does not require more political exile, nor more conferences, statements, and meetings that do not impact the lives of its citizens. Yemen needs a state, leadership present on its territory, unified national decision-making, institutions operating from within, security and military forces under single national command, and a political project that ends the war rather than merely managing its consequences.

Our brothers in the Kingdom have provided much, and perhaps the time has come for one of the most significant forms of support to Yemen to be the return of decision-making and responsibility to the Yemenis themselves. If the objective is to restore the state, then the state must be within Yemen. If the goal is to end the war, then the decision-making must be directed towards its conclusion. If the aim is to build a stable Yemen, then Yemenis must assume responsibility for its construction. The final message to our brothers: You have borne immense burdens in the Yemeni file and contributed greatly. It is perhaps time to transition from managing the crisis to supporting Yemenis in resolving it. Assist them, yes. Support them, yes. Protect your security and interests, yes. But allow Yemenis to manage their homeland and bear responsibility for their decisions. Do not let support substitute for responsibility, hosting become permanent political residency, or aid transform into an interest system sustained by the crisis.

The time has come for Yemenis to return to their homeland, for Yemeni decision-making to be internalized, and for the relationship with our brothers to shift from crisis management to supporting Yemenis in finding solutions. Yemen can only reclaim its state when the responsibility for its restoration becomes primarily Yemeni, the external role becomes supportive rather than substitutive, the sibling relationship becomes one of assistance rather than guardianship, and the decision-making becomes national rather than beholden. This is the advice that may prove most beneficial to Yemen today, most reassuring to our brethren, and closest to ending this protracted conflict. Yemen does not need more years of war managed from abroad; it needs the return of the state internally, the return of responsibility to its rightful holders, and the return of decision-making to the Yemeni people.