While it remains plausible that the trajectory of the conflict involving Iran and subsequent geopolitical developments in the Gulf could elevate their strategic impetus to engage in hostilities, analysis suggests that – even in such an eventuality – the Houthi rebels’ actions will be highly calculated, wrote Ari Heistein Guided by their core strategic interests, it is posited that they would exercise operational restraint to mitigate the scope and severity of any retaliatory countermeasures . With the central pillar of the Iranian-led “Axis of Resistance” under threat from a joint US–Israeli campaign against the Iranian regime, it is natural to wonder why the Axis’s rising star is sitting on the sidelines in Yemen. The Houthis, after all, present themselves as fearless, deeply radicalized warriors who actively seek confrontation with the United States, Israel, and their regional partners. But a closer examination reveals clear ideological, strategic, and practical reasons why the Houthis are not rushing to Tehran’s defense. While events could develop in ways that increase the Houthis’ incentive to strike, if they do, their core interests indicate that they are likely to do so in a manner that limits the blows they absorb in return. Even if the ideological case for Houthi involvement were stronger, the current moment is particularly inopportune for the Houthis to take up arms against a powerful US-led coalition. The destruction of Houthi-run ports by Israeli and American strikes, the decline in foreign aid due to concerns over diversion, powerful sanctions designations from Washington, the relocation of key financial institutions to government-held territory, and the presumably finite degree to which government coffers, banks, and the population can be looted have all contributed to an impending revenue crisis for the regime with no textbook solution in sight. While the Houthis have managed to prop up their regime despite paying public sector employees only a fraction of their owed salaries for years, this does not guarantee that the continuation is tenable. A worsening crisis could push the Yemeni public to a breaking point, cause the regime’s hired guns to stop fighting or even defect, or deprive the group of the materials needed to replenish its arsenal. Having only recently begun to rehabilitate the seaports upon which their economy depends, it stands to reason that the Houthis are not rushing to provoke another round of strikes which would likely target them. And despite the reputation they have cultivated as perpetually seeking conflict, the Houthis have a well-documented history of accepting strategic pauses when they have lost momentum and need time to rest and rearm before the next round. The group’s strategic calculus pulls heavily toward restraint. While the Houthi movement has become more institutionalized over time, it remains highly personalized, based on familial ties and personal history and relationships. A campaign of the kind that eliminated multiple layers of senior Hezbollah and Iranian leadership could cause chaos in the Houthis’ internal power dynamics. Managing such a crisis would be all the more difficult at a time when the group already lacks the financial resources typically used in Yemen to co-opt dissenters. Even after Hezbollah entered the war, the Houthis appear content to express solidarity with Iran from a distance. This highlights a key difference: The Islamic Republic’s fight for survival is existential for Hezbollah, a group which is operationally and ideologically inseparable from Tehran. For the Houthis, by contrast, intervention could endanger the survival of their project. That said, Houthi calculations could shift. For example, in a moment of desperation, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) could offer the Houthis major incentives to participate in the fighting, potentially providing a lifeline that would allow them to stave off economic crisis. In that case, or if the Gulf Cooperation Council states become more directly involved in strikes on Iran, the Houthis may try to thread the needle between activism and restraint by striking Gulf targets (rather than American or Israeli ones) in the aim of eliciting a limited response. Regardless of where Houthi policy currently stands, the threat must be watched closely, as one of the key advantages exploited continuously since October 7, 2023, has been surprise. |
