Opinion: Why the Horn of Africa could become the next front in the Iran war

The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran spread almost as soon as it started. In two weeks, at least 11 territories from the Mediterranean to the Arabian Gulf have come under attack from Iran or its proxies in retaliation for the US-Israel strikes. The Horn of Africa — a strategic point — could yet become a new theater., wrote Tomi Oladipo in semafor.com

Oladipo, an award-winning journalist who covers global affairs with a focus on African security, geopolitics, added “Djibouti is already exposed. It hosts the largest US military base in Africa: Camp Lemonnier, a key logistical hub for American operations in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf”.

Next door, Somaliland is emerging as a potential host for an Israeli security presence. Both sit at one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints, where the Red Sea narrows into the Gulf of Aden.

Meanwhile, the wider Horn of Africa is grappling with fragile states, active jihadist insurgencies, and territories whose sovereignty is contested or unrecognized.

To the north, in Yemen, the Houthi movement has so far been unusually restrained since the US-Israeli strikes on Iran began on Feb. 28, despite being an Iranian proxy.

The group spent nearly two years attacking commercial shipping in the Red Sea, disrupting a significant portion of global commercial trade. This provoked a Washington-led multinational armed response.

After weeks of airstrikes, the Houthis agreed to a ceasefire with the US, which could explain their caution. But their leadership has warned they could still get involved.

The current war is already disrupting global oil supply from the Strait of Hormuz. Adding another Red Sea blockade — along the path of roughly 15% of global trade — would be disastrous.

The Horn of Africa has largely avoided becoming a direct theater for the kind of great proxy conflict playing out in the Middle East, but that may be changing.

If the Houthis eventually retaliate, Camp Lemonnier would be a target of interest. It earns Djibouti $63 million a year in rent — significant revenue for one of the continent’s smallest states.

Hosting foreign military powers brings clear financial and diplomatic benefits. But for Djibouti and Somaliland it may also carry risks.

As the Iran war widens, bases that once symbolized security may become liabilities. That is the trap now facing both territories.

The Horn of Africa has long been coveted for the same qualities that make it vulnerable: its coastline, its chokepoints, its weakness. What is changing is that the war those qualities were always expected to attract has finally arrived. For Djibouti and Somaliland, the question is no longer whether to get involved — it is whether they have any real choice.